A Situational ‘Balance Sheet’ of Myanmar/Burma at a Glance

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Abstract
This paper explains the current position of Myanmar/Burma under the present administration—a quasi-civilian government, formed itself with many ex-generals from the previous regime and highlighted its transformation process. It also highlights the country’s political development in a historical perspective whilst listing the major good, bad and ugly situations that Myanmar/Burma confronts. The study not only reports about Myanmar/Burma from diverse angles including tensions, limitations, pressures, failures, opportunities and possibilities, but also discusses the current push by students in national educational law as a test to the government’s level of maturity in its democratic practice. Furthermore, this paper discusses how the country and her people can move forward on the path of transformation through generating internal players’ collaboration as well as receiving international cooperation from external players to consequently enhance Myanmar/Burma’s position on development and democracy.

1. The good, the bad and the ugly

Myanmar/Burma is commonly portrayed in both international and local media as a key country in transition. The country draws the highest attention and continued focus by numerous global citizens including activists in the NGO community, responsible representatives from different IGOs, people in official aid communities from foreign governments, multinational aid agencies, academics belonging to overseas universities, foreign investors, policy makers from regional organisations and international agencies and world leaders as they are rushing to undertake something of potential positive outcome for Myanmar/Burma’s current and future development path.

Consequently, the country is described and labeled by many based on their individual perceptions and interests as shortlisted as follows: the next economic frontier in Asia, the world’s largely untapped market, the emerging country from sixty years of hibernation, not a paradise but caution and patience are the keys, the land of geopolitical importance and strategic balance of Asia and a beggar with a golden bowl. The current reality and future potential in terms of democracy, peace and prosperity in Myanmar/Burma depends heavily on a combination of domestic (internal) and external factors.

The natural resources of Myanmar/Burma are attractive for foreign investment due to the fact that the country is filled with all kinds of natural resources such as, but not limited to, offshore gas, copper, iron, gold, gems, minerals, teak and other forest and marine resources. Foreign countries inclusive of China, India, the United States, ASEAN and all others desire these in this age of the energy-security race.

Until the most recent past, the country was under military-led administration. This governance caused mismanagement with wrong priorities, accumulating inefficiency of all kinds for more than half a century. The result was clear as Myanmar/Burma was ranked consecutively as one of the least developed countries on the world development ladder since the early 1980s. Electricity supplies are erratic and the agrarian sector is dominated by subsistence farming; other productive sectors show either stagnant or negligible results, thus wasting the country’s scarce resources while piping national budget down to meeting the security sector’s vast demand over satisfying the basic needs of its citizens (social sector).

Even though the present administration of
Myanmar/Burma is nominally a civilian government (quasi-government), both inactive and ex-generals working in military services or in civil services remain a massively powerful force everywhere in the country's hierarchy. It is partly because the military was made as the country's dominant institution for many decades by subsequent governments. Therefore, any Myanmar/Burma watches infer that there is a possibility for military intervention or counteraction against any current trends if any democratisation processes and development measures affect the military's accumulated advantage positions in any negative way.

President U Thein Sein, former Prime Minister and military general under the State Peace Development Council has initiated several reform measures widely through his executive branch while the military representatives and the USDA-led parliament members in the legislative branch enacted some important laws during their sessions. Both international and domestic observers applauded these steps, as there was marked progress with positive recognition followed by relevant responses in order to accelerate current reform steps to bear meaningful fruits for all in Myanmar/Burma with positive spillovers. In fact, the President clearly stated, “Our education system has collapsed, our health system has collapsed, we have too much corruption, we are not treating the minorities well, we have got to reform and do something.” This directly shows that there is a capacity-limit—a lack of capacity to implement positive measures toward any problematic or targeted areas whether it is higher education, health planning, public administration, economic management or environmental protection.

Figure 1: Myanmar/Burma’s major political events in history
Therefore, it is important to observe how the general public in Myanmar/Burma truly see, feel and analyze those changes affecting both their individual lives as well as on the country as a whole. With such interest attached in mind, carefully arranged fact-finding trips were made between 2012 and 2014 to several local areas and regions of Myanmar/Burma before pursuing any concrete research projects concerning with Myanmar/Burma’s transition process.

Accordingly, the findings based on my own visual surveys gained over trips, individual hearings from locals and experts and situational analysis through available materials are categorized—the good, the bad and the ugly—as the initial study-inputs for paving any meaningful follow-up activities including expert meetings (Special Seminar Series) to be organized in the future.

There are some positive changes that were made possibly by the present Thein Sein administration. The general situation including minimum freedoms, economic opportunities and certain social and political rights became a reality compared to the pre-2010 election period under the military government (SPDC). Moreover, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners soon after the 2010 election under the U Thein Sein government reduced the restriction on censorship, press and broadcast laws, allowing dissidents to return home, forming labor unions, inviting direct foreign investments and dealing with ethnic nationality groups.

However, on the dark side of the current Myanmar/Burma, there are corruption epidemics, democracy deficits, ethnic conflicts, communal violence, flows of refugees and IDPs, human rights abuses, land confiscation, human trafficking, crony interests and adhoc-ism are deeply rooted in Myanmar/Burma’s governing system and bureaucracy.

The “China factor” on Myanmar/Burma from multiple dimensions is treated under ‘the ugly’ issues as it generates major negative impacts on the current and future courses of the country, ringing an alarm to both international and local players.

### 2. ‘Balance sheet’ and the situation of ‘testing the waters’

#### Table 1: Situational analysis of Myanmar/Burma

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behavior of Buddhist ultra-nationalists

Achievements
- Economy, accumulated FDI, crucial legislation, relaxing media restrictions, the easing of political space, the opening of social media

Checklist | Opportunities | Enablers | Current pushes
---|---|---|---
5 | Bilateral and multilateral initiatives to connect with international networks | International community, Global CSOs, International and Regional Financial Institutions, the EU | Students' boycott on the NEL

Checklist | Before the new elections | During the new elections | Beyond the new elections
---|---|---|---
6 | More boycotts by monks, workers, farmers, ethnic people and students | Unsatisfactory, instability and complex confusions | 

Among Myanmar/Burma’s internal players (sons known as ‘thas’), the students known collectively as ‘kyang-tha’ have been very active in nation building processes. They are currently demanding to amend the National Educational Law (NEL), which they see unfit, unhealthy, undemocratic and lacking inclusion and representation in meeting the needs of students and the people of Myanmar/Burma. Unlike 1988, however, students focus on demanding major changes in democratic education benefiting both current and future generations of the country, rather than asking for a change in the regime or any other political targets. Kyaung-tha have initiated this demand since November 2014 but the government and the parliament had chosen not to hear their voice as the National Education Law (NEL) had already been approved in September 2014, effectively neglecting Kyaung-tha’s needs and concerns.

As a result, the Action Committee for Democratic Education (ACDE) strongly criticized that the approved NEL centralizes authority, restricts formation of student and teacher unions and curbs circular freedom. Consequently, the students’ boycott demanded that the government initiate negotiations with them regarding the approved NEL within sixty days and called for a quadripartite dialogue involving ACDE, National Network for Education Reform (NNER), parliament and the government. Kyaung-tha highlighted that the matter has to be addressed urgently for creation of national education policies and laws that endure the democratic education system. Moreover, Kyaung-tha across Myanmar/Burma’s universities are staging a nation-wide demonstration by marching to Yangon in order to show their serious concerns on the country’s education affecting the future as well as their firm determination to make the government amend the law for re-enacting. Due to the uncompressed process and concern towards the Kyaung-tha’s demands to be integrated into the national educational law, now the nation-wide universities’ strike reach to meet its peak in terms of momentum as citizens. This movement includes the monks (Sangha or ‘Phaya-tha’) in cities in towns along their peaceful walking-march toward Yangon to join the Kyaung-tha and guard them. Kyaung-tha demands the government to address the following eleven issues to be integrated by amending the NEL. They also commit to accomplish these demands by means of negotiations with the relevant stakeholders.

- (1) inclusion of representatives of teachers and students in the legislation process of education policies and laws, by-laws and other related laws,
- (2) the right to freely establish and operate student and teachers unions and a legal recognition for them,
- (3) establishment of National Education Commission and University Coordination Committee mentioned in the approved National Education Law,
(4) self-determination and self-management on educational affairs of individual state/regions and schools, (5) modifying current examination and university articulation system, (6) modifying teaching methods to ensure freedom for thinking and self-studying of students, (7) inclusion of a provision in National Education Law that ensure freedom for the practice of ethnic languages and other mother tongue based multi-lingual education for ethnic populations, (8) inclusive education for all children including children with disabilities, (9) resumption of enrollment for students previously expelled from schools due to the student uprisings, (10) allocation of twenty percent of national budget for education and (11) regulating free compulsory education up to middle school rather than primary school.

Only after Kyaung-tha initiated their peaceful march, the government had started negotiating with them as the government’s repeated failures had threatened Kyaung-tha to back off from strikes. Even though the initial situation creates worrisome preparations for the general public (citizens or ‘Taithupyitha’), four rounds of negotiations have taken place to defuse the tension as the representatives from the government, parliament, the National Network for Educational Reform (NNER) and Kyaung-tha discussed the demand on amending the National Education Law.

Since the key demands include the government reintegrating students school for political reasons, increasing educational spending to twenty percent of the national budget, amending the law to decentralize curricular control, allowing the formation of student and teacher unions and establishing a multi-lingual education system, the demands are widely accepted and supported by people from all walk of lives including ethnic populations residing across multi-ethnic, multi-region and multi-culture country.

Due to the fact that Kyaung-tha had successfully demanded eleven points to be included in the NEL despite the series of negotiations over four-party roundtable negotiations, the government has, in principle, agreed to the demands of the students and education advocates protesting the controversial NEL during a meeting on February 11. The parliamentary representatives also showed a will to respond as the NEL has scheduled to reach to the parliament on February 16.

Students have been at the forefront of protest actions since a pro-independence sentiment picked up steam against Myanmar/Burma’s British colonizers in the early 20th century. Successive junta governments had dealt harshly with young dissenters, most notably in 1988, when a student-led uprising was brutally crushed. As a result, thousands were killed in the streets of Yangon in the bloody crackdown. Due to the ever-growing mutual mistrust between the government and citizens, coupled with the practical reality of the parliament being fully under control by the unelected 25% of military representatives, the students are very cautious on the compromised agreement on the government’s side. Consequently, Kyaung-tha is continuing their peaceful march to Yangon through various routes to inform the citizens of the present situation and related developments in an open manner.

The government, on the other hand, is keeping pressure on Kyaung-tha by broadcasting, threatening or warning of their march through announcements in order to keep law and order as well as public safety. (4) This generates complicated tension among all citizens soon after the four-party talk reached a tentative agreement. The crucial question in the heads of many such as citizens, international onlookers and Myanmar/Burma watchers includes—why does not (cannot) the government accept (accommodate) the dichromatic culture of seeing such kinds of Kyaung-tha’s peaceful demonstrations demanding on the NEL (rather than a political demand) or Kyaung-tha informing citizens on the matter in form of public interaction. The government that is currently leading a democratic transition should tolerate or guarantee such democratic culture and in turn ease the unnecessary tension among all
players.

A student protest group in the midst of a march from Mandalay to Yangon released a statement on February 13 stating that they would continue their demonstration until the parliament passes the amended NEL in line with their demands. Across Myanmar/Burma, groups of student protestors have set out march with the sole intention of converging on Yangon. Students from the Ayeyarwady Division, Dawei and central Myanmar/Burma have all followed the lead of the main group of protestors originating in Mandalay. The group began its march from Mandalay on January 20 and arrived to the Thayarwaddy Township in West Bago Region on Friday, having completed nearly two-thirds of the 400-mile journey. According to the statement released by the students, if the parliament’s decision is not satisfactory, they will march in protest to Yangon as a show of victory to be solidified with the citizens.

The nature of this demonstration, its humble cause, the timing of it, the support gathered from the citizens along with influence/confidence generated and the success of such Kyaung-tha demonstration proves that there is still room for Myanmar/Burma and her governments and citizens to reach a common platform where the nation can be moved many ways forward peacefully. The lone condition is that if and only if the government has a firm courage to address every non-political and political challenges peacefully through democratic means. If the government handles peacefully without using force, this humble cause driven and the peaceful Kyaung-tha demonstration can be positively understood as ‘testing the waters’ for the people of Myanmar/Burma, including the government in order to reach a higher level of maturity in her democratization process.

3. The need: Preventing the worst ugliness

The entire year of 2014 was filled with both good and bad evidences of the government’s mishandling, including several cases of use of violent force against citizens, unlawful arrests of activists and media people, continued armed conflicts in a couple of major ethnic regions and deteriorating socioeconomic situations of the general public. It is Taitupyitha or the citizen’s natural hope to see 2015 to be a better year with the promised free and fair election to be held around the end of the year.

Among many possible worrisome dangers, a list of few concerns deserves a serious scrutiny. The first concern is that her biggest neighbor, China should not view Myanmar/Burma as sort of a ‘cheap/free vacant land’ to exploit, invest and occupy whenever needed for market expansion purposes for China’s cheap products, pure resource-extraction and energy security and landslide population transfer or a human erosion—anything neglecting in setting an atmosphere that supports a public-private partnership. Such concern is an existing and accumulating issue as commonly rooted in the heads of the general public. It happened only due to the lack of serious concerns before committing any national agreements signed between the subsequent governments (or its affiliates) and Chinese governments and their affiliated companies.

In other words, the culprit is the ‘bad governance’ of Myanmar/Burma as its driving causes include (1) lack of transparency in any major business deals made under previous military government, (2) neglecting to set the atmosphere (3) lack of establishing referring measures to practice ‘rule of law’ and the related culture, (4) lack of enforcement for respecting the existing rules by the governmental agencies and officials and (5) continuing a well-known practice of deep-rooted behavior of corruption in every issue from a very small scale to a large scale. If these kinds of major distortions are not corrected timely, especially before the planned election in 2015, a possibility of the country known as ‘Burma’ in reality may turn to become ‘Chi-ma’ in the near future. The people of Myanmar/Burma including the government and their national policies must address the issue seriously and proactively, not just as a response after
Another concern is about a ‘show-case’ diplomacy with the attitudes and functions of the ongoing peace process undertaken by the government with the ethnic armed groups. The process seems to be designed for appealing to the donors and the international community on one hand, while being used as a time-buying machine for generating political advantage with respect to the planned election as well as for applying the ‘divide-and-rule’ principle among different ethnic armed groups and ethnic populations. The country like Myanmar/Burma needs ‘ethnic equality’ and ‘diversity in unity’ principles since it is not only a multi-ethnic country but also a multi-religion and multi-culture oriented country. Many of Myanmar/Burma’s most recent communal violence were caused by a sort of pre-planned and organized activities by a small group exploiting on residents and on-lookers through the ‘divide-and-rule’ and ‘multi-religion’ grounds. Therefore, a genuine, inclusive, representative, rule-based and transparent process of peace deal is necessary, which as of now is clearly missing the current process sidelines main stakeholder—the people.

Out of many serious concerns, the people of Myanmar/Burma must put emphasis on preventing a situation that is a replay of either direct or indirect military rule with suppression, like in past cases. All efforts including initiating movements that ‘test the waters’ on national issues must be harmonized with other precautionary measures through cooperation and coordination by both formal and informal channels/tracks involving international donors, institutions and CSOs and the related activities. If that danger cannot be prevented and the nation is slipped back to the military rule in one way or another, that could be the worst ugliness that will shadow not only Myanmar/Burma and her people for a very long time but also for the rest of the world.

4. The only insurance

Myanmar/Burma does not only portray problems and dangers. The country has a lot of potentials and possibilities as well as a couple of major challenges to be overcome. Those challenges cannot be tackled over night and thus Myanmar/Burma and her people should not be left alone in this struggle. However, there are the issues that require the people of Myanmar/Burma to handle and decide while the international community provides an enabling atmosphere and empowering inputs.

The country’s sons (‘thas’), who are the main internal players of Myanmar/Burma’s democratic future and development have proven their effective roles for safeguarding as well as promoting national goods throughout history; starting from pre-colonial ancient kingdoms, colonial periods, the post-independence democratic period, military regimes to the present quasi-civilian government. Those players or the ‘thas,’ namely, ‘Taithupyi-tha’ (known as the general public), ‘Taiyin-tha’ (known was ethnic nationalities), ‘Phaya-tha’ (known as Sangha or monks), ‘Kyoung-tha’ (known as students) and ‘Sit-tha’ (known as soldiers), have been interacting, cooperating and confronting each other in Myanmar/Burma’s pre-independence as well as post-independence national struggles, crises and for a change in system.

Among many of such records in Myanmar/Burma’s modern history, the 1988 student-led, nation-wide democracy movement drew attention from the world while the people across Myanmar/Burma joined hands in order to topple the government in a couple of months. It was the first and the most effective cornerstone in laying foundation for the country’s focus on a democratization path, which could not be neglected by any subsequent military governments up to today’s government.

Another key player of the nation, monks had led, on belief of the general public and the students, the 2007 famous Saffron Revolution against the repressive military regime of Myanmar/Burma to
demand for democracy and freedom, drawing global attention. The Saffron Revolution was a cry for freedom and justice, reinforcing the foundation of the demands laid by the 1988 student-led democracy movement towards a democratic country. These major activities by the internal players have been pushing the previous military rulers to consider a manageable change in order for them to continue governing the country. The result was the unpopular 2008 constitution, the related heavily unfree and unfair rigged elections of 2010 and the birth of the present quasi-civilian government formed by both ex-military men and active military men at the core of Myanmar/Burma's three branches of power as known to "old wine in the new glass" phenomenon.

As described in the earlier section of this paper, the present government has also introduced a series of politico-administrative and socio-economic reforms in phases as its own pace since 2011. Most of the reforms produced some tangible positive impacts on a particular segment of population. However, the majority still did not feel that it had affected the people residing in towns, cities and especially in rural and ethnic regions, who are dissatisfied with both the slow process and the intangible effects on them. There are progresses as well as hurdles and back-pedaling that all together create another set of challenges to be tackled for a better future of the nation and her people.

The National League for Democracy representing the general public combined with the cooperation and the organizational strength by the 88GS Peace and Open Society worked collectively in a nationwide signatory campaign to amend the 2008 constitution. This type of postmodern collaboration between Myanmar/Burma's main opposition party and the organization run by the leaders of the 1988 democracy movement who receives public trust and affection, could produce more than five million signatures demanding to amend the 2008 constitution. The parliament, on the other hand, formed its own inter-party and the 2008 constitution review committee to see the matter independently. Although the parliamentary committee did not endorse the changes the public and the joint signatory campaign by the NLD and the 88GSPOS, the joint movement for the constitutional amendment campaign contributed very positively for the government and all of its power branches to carefully and seriously consider about the key amendment articles without which any credible election processes and results are doubtful.

Such significant democratic movements and public campaigns initiated and collaborated among the major players of Myanmar/Burma have prove that there is a fairly promising chance for the country to be genuinely and quickly democratized toward building a peaceful and developed country sooner than later. Since all the internal players, except the military at this moment have clearly highlighted the need for correcting the constitutional flaw, which otherwise stays as a major roadblock against building peace, political stability, economy, social development, human security and democracy, as the most urgent action that needs to be undertaken. Correcting major flaws in the 2008 constitution alone can positively and quickly guarantee the needs, aspirations and the rights of all ethnic nationalities and groups with diverse historical, cultural, religious and ideological backgrounds in order for both the government and the people of Myanmar/Burma to build a truly multiethnic, peaceful, developed democracy in the near future.

5. The implications

In addition, the most recent peaceful campaign initiated by the new generation of students of all universities across Myanmar/Burma on amending the parliament-approved National Education Law clearly sends two parallel signals.

The first implication is that there are still sever conflict of interests between those who push for changes in a system and those parts of the system solidly resisting the necessary changes. The NEL was crafted by responsible persons from the Ministry of Education and enacted by the parliamentarians when
put for approving; however the parliamentarians knowingly and purposefully neglected the demands and requests forwarded by the students, civil society organizations and advocate including the NNER and the people of Myanmar/Burma. Without any meaningful, genuine and required changes in the most important sector—the social sector reform starting from the NEL—it is unrealistic to see any recommendations to be workable in the security sector reform for a peaceful future of Myanmar/Burma.

The message can be proven by looking at the most recent example of students' boycott on the NEL in order for the government to add amendments. After encountering various obstacles and obstructions, students' representatives met government officials in Nay Pyi Daw on January 28 and signed an agreement committing to these quadripartite talks. The talks regarding certain key preconditions for negotiating the element priority points were then held on February 1 in Yangon. However, the Myanmar/Burma government did not agree to these preconditions, including refraining from taking legal actions against the protesters and their supporters. Meanwhile, the authorities have employed various methods of intimidation and harassment against the students and their supporters including (1) pressuring local monasteries not to accommodate the students as they pass through on their protest marches; (2) Infiltrating marches and attempting to instigate violence from within; (3) temporarily detaining local supporters; and (4) physically attacking local supporters by throwing stones. Despite this, the students have resumed their protest marches, in turn receiving overwhelming support from local residents along the road, expressing their fundamental rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, unaffected by constant and explicit threats of arrest and violence. As in Hong Kong, government intransigence is being met with principled, determined and brave activism, as people find their voice and courage to demand the democratic values and rights to which they are entitled under international law.

The second implication is that there is no impossibility as the students' demands on the NEL have principally produced a temporary agreement through the four-party negotiations. However, a threat remains as a certain part of the government's old mentality (88 battle-mentality), seeing the students and their peaceful demand as the rebellious enemy through broadcasting and by other means, such as using the government's media and communication mechanism. That threatening tone and announcements push many citizens in an uncomfortable position and state of fear, which only consolidate the students' move and determination. Unless the government changes its stance, gets rid of its old battle-mentality and opens itself to Myanmar/Burma's players through many interacting and confidence-building public actives, starting from handling the students’ march to Yangon and listening to the needs of its citizens, there will be no promising future as the country is being governed by an unpredictable government.

On one hand, it is also the rights, the roles and responsibilities of Myanmar/Burma's citizens to 'test the waters' in the practice of democratic culture under the system, reinforcing the principles and initiatives of the reform-minded, liberal elements of the government to have more political space and voice in responding to the needs of the people. This includes encouraging the government to move on a path of 'mutual trust' in dealing with the people including students on a national agenda by respecting the rule of law, code of conduct and role of engagement in accordance with globally respectable norms. Again, regarding this point, a conclusive recommendation is that a united collaboration among the main internal players with empowered support by local and international CSOs should not only prevent unwanted violent confrontations but also push the authority towards a peaceful peaceful and civilized settlement.

As stated most eloquently by the Coordination Committee of Myanmar Civil Society Organisation Form in their January 30 statement: “We strongly
urge the international community, especially international governments and international non-governmental organizations operating in education and youth sectors providing either financial and/or technical assistances for education sector reform, to ensure that their assistants genuinely and effectively support the [NEL]'s compliance with democracy and human rights principles.” (5) A total of 64 different organizations including CSOs have issued statements support the students' position, their demands and their struggle. The negotiations continued on from February 1 to February 2; yet as of February 3, the Myanmar/Burma government had postponed further discussions without any agreement until after Union Day on February 12. The students are, and should be the primary stakeholder of educational reform. The citizens stand with them and urge the Myanmar/Burma government to take genuine steps towards meaningful dialogue. The international community—particularly the donors of education sector reform—must recognize the legitimacy of the students’ movement and ensure that their voices are the foundation for the promotion of democracy in Myanmar/Burma.

However, on the other hand, the struggles and the problems of the people of Myanmar/Burma should not be left alone in the hands of the government as it is still in a transition stage, lacking many support including international check and control. There is no other way out for the international community in helping Myanmar/Burma led by the present government at this stage, except deepening the current magnitude of engagement to produce required results intended from each sector reform benefiting both the nation, the people and the community as a whole. Similarly, any international engagements for enabling the government to accomplish tangible national and sartorial targets through the so-called track one (government to government) should be parallel followed by harmonious empowering schemes prompted by various independent channels of track three (CSOs and voluntary sector) focusing on the capacities, rights and benefits of the individuals and groups (TBGs). In addition, the track two's facilitation, monitoring and evaluation can strengthen the role and effectiveness of the institutions as well as generate capable actors in Myanmar/Burma to be more responsible functioning their duties. The process will transform Myanmar/Burma's actors in both public and private sectors to become duty-conscious, time-bound and people-centered players, audiences and advocates in social, economic, administrative and political sectors gradually. Without those individuals and groups participating in any social sector reform agendas, there will neither be any assurance nor insurance about what people are expecting from the government’s existing transformation measures.

In case the government is distorted from the existing path of democratic transformation in Myanmar/Burma, there is a 'responsibility to protest' on the sides of the international community, regional neighbors and global institutions and organizations by requiring the government to respect the norms, treaties, standards and abide major international laws. The international leaders and institutions under the world's system must strictly practice the necessary enforcements for major obligations against the government of Myanmar/Burma. There should be a warning system in this regard as a preventive diplomacy or measure, which is more effective than an aftermath solution in both economic and human terms. All measures of internationally applicable engagement, empowerment, enforcement policies will be more effective in the case of Myanmar/Burma's peaceful transformation toward a developed democracy if there is a system of reserving any type of collective embargoes when circumstances are set wrong by the government. The government must be accountable for that, and by doing so, the present 'balance sheet' of Myanmar/Burma could earn a higher place on a scoreboard.
References